Rendezvous security worries.

ok, i've read on basic implementations stratus through rtmfp.  worrying security vulnerabilities of rendezvous implementation.

 

from understanding, stands right stratus server not validate user id , developer key provided client.  preventing malicious user obtaining proper developer key , user id, mimicing security transcoding of both, , connecting stratus while pretending user who's credentials comprimised?

 

i looked through forums rather , haven't seen posts discussing sercurity related issues stratus server.  can tell, appears stratus server relies on client alone provide userid validation.

 

if stratus server not provide user id validation, have useful client side implementations talk about?  also, adboe plan implement stratus server-side userid validation?

 

again, if stratus provide user validation, apologize not knowing.

stratus doesn't know "user ids".  purely constructs of application.  stratus knows client's peerid, unforgeable (by mean it's computationally infeasible appear stratus or flash player existing peerid of other peer).  , peerid has meaning lifetime of netconnection rtmfp server (such stratus); cease exist disconnect , can't recovered or re-used.

 

the videophonelabs , reg.cgi examples intended illustrative of underlying concepts of p2p communication , mapping application-defined users peerids.  explicitly not secure @ "user id" level.

 

i'm not sure mean stratus "not validat[ing] ... developer key provided client" though.  stratus *does* validate it, in sense provided developer key must *a* legitimate key issued adobe.

 

rtmfp provides interesting low-level hooks upon can build several kinds of sophisticated security.  mentioned, peerid of flash player unforgeable.  register , them using trusted , secure source (https , application-level username/password).  can use secure session nonces (exposed in netstream.nearnonce , netstream.farnonce), unguessable, unforgeable, can't observed passive third party, , can't intercepted without changing them, along local shared objects , cryptographic hash function, build ssh-like identity continuity system which, while not authenticating user, can used prove "next time" you're talking same person last time.

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